

## Message Text

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0454

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC ON CURRENT STATUS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS (APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP AT THE CLOSE OF ITS MEETING ON NOVEMBER 28) COVERING PERIOD SEPTEMBER 18 THROUGH NOVEMBER 26, 1974. THE REPORT WILL BE PRESENTED TO NAC MORNING OF NOVEMBER 29 BY AN AD HOC GROUP TEAM HEADED BY US REP.

2. FOR USNATO: INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO ASSURE DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF THIS REPORT TO MEMBER MISSIONS IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIPT OF THE MESSAGE THROUGH NATO CHANNELS. USNATO IS REQUESTED TO CHECK THAT THIS IS BEING DONE IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT EACH PERMREP HAS PHYSICALLY RECEIVED COPY PRIOR TO THE ORAL REPORT BY US REP ON

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NOVEMBER 29.

BEGIN TEXT OF REPORT TO NAC:

AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC ON CURRENT STATUS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

1. THIS REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA COVERS THE PERIOD FROM THE RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1974, THROUGH THE INFORMAL MEETING OF NOVEMBER 26, 1974. IT UPDATES THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT OF JULY 23 ON THE PREVIOUS ROUND, ANALYZES THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND COMMENTS ON FUTURE PROSPECTS.

I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

2. THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY FOR THIRTEEN MONTHS. THE WEST HAS CONTINUED THE DELIBERATE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS POSITION. THE EAST HAS MADE SOME LIMITED PROCEDURAL MOVES REGARDING THE PHASING ISSUE, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE US AND SOVIET UNION COULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES FIRST, WITH OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REDUCING THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. ON NOV 26, THE EAST ALSO PROPOSED A FREEZE ON ALL MILITARY MANPOWER OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE THUS FAR BROUGHT NO IMPORTANT MOVEMENT AND THERE IS NO APPARENT PROSPECT OF REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREED ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS.

3. ON OCTOBER 15, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES INTRODUCED A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED VERSION OF THEIR PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, IN WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD REDUCE 20,000 MEN DURING 1975, WITH ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REDUCING THEIR FORCES. THE ALLIES HAVE MADE CLEAR RIGHT FROM NOVEMBER 1973, WHEN THE EAST INTRODUCED THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THIS INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL IN THE FORM OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE WARSAW PACT DRAFT AGREEMENT, THAT THIS EASTERN POSITION MET NONE OF THE WEST'S BASIC REQUIREMENTS. NONETHELESS, THE EAST HAS PERSISTED WITH THE PROPOSAL. IT HAS INTRODUCED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME FIRST-STEP PROPOSAL IN EACH

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OF THE LAST THREE ROUNDS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, HAS NOW ACCORDED THIS PROPOSAL AN "OFFICIAL" STATUS, HAS INCLUDED CERTAIN LIMITED POSITIVE ELEMENTS FOR THE ALLEGED PURPOSE OF MEETING WESTERN INTERESTS, AND HAS GENERATED A MOUNTING PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AIMED AT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION, HAILING THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL AS A COMPROMISE THAT COULD UNLOCK THE DOOR TO A FIRST AGREEMENT, AT AN EARLY TIME. ON NOVEMBER 26, AFTER THE WEST HAD SAID THE EASTERN

INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE AS A  
BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, THE WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES  
TABLED A PROPOSAL THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTADP000  
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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN - SECTION 2 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA  
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(A) THE GENERAL ARGUMENT THAT OVERALL SECURITY AND STABILITY  
IN THE AREA WOULD BE ENHANCED THROUGH EASTERN ACCEPTANCE  
OF THE ALLIED END GOAL OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND  
FORCES; (B) THAT ANY AGREEMENT WOULD IMPOSE CERTAIN  
CONTINUING LIMITATIONS ON BOTH SIDES, BUT THAT THESE WOULD  
BE MORE IMPORTANT IN THE CASE OF NATO THAN IN THE CASE OF  
THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES; AND (C) THAT THE SOVIET UNION  
WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF ITS LARGE FORCES  
LOCATED ON TERRITORY ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

6. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, IT WOULD NOT SEEM  
LIKELY THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN VIENNA OF THESE  
ARGUMENTS, PLUS THE PRESENT WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS  
BY THE WEST, COULD OF THEMSELVES BRING THE EAST TO ACCEPT  
THE ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS, WHICH INVOLVE  
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INTER ALIA MUCH LARGER PACT REDUCTIONS IN MANPOWER AND

SUBSTANTIAL UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

7. IN THIS SITUATION, THE AD HOC GROUP SEES TWO POSSIBLE COURSES OF FUTURE ACTION:

(A) ON THE ONE HAND, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA COULD CONTINUE TO ELABORATE DETAILS OF THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION WHILE MAINTAINING ITS SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS. AS STATED ABOVE, THE GROUP CONSIDERS THAT, IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THIS COURSE HOLDS OUT LITTLE PROSPECT FOR MAKING MUCH PROGRESS IN VIENNA TOWARDS AGREED ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS. NONETHELESS, ADOPTION OF THIS APPROACH MIGHT BE JUSTIFIED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE RELATING TO SALT AND CSCE.

(B) AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION COULD BE TO ADD FURTHER ELEMENTS TO THE ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR WESTERN REDUCTIONS AS AN INDUCEMENT TO THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS. THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT, EVEN IF THIS WERE DONE, IT WOULD EVOKE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM THE EAST. BUT UNTIL IT HAS BEEN TRIED THOROUGHLY, THE ALLIES WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE TO WHAT EXTENT THE EASTERN RESISTANCE TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS IS GENUINELY BASED ON AN EASTERN VIEW THAT THE REDUCTIONS IN NATO FORCES WHICH THE WEST IS NOW OFFERING ARE TOO SMALL TO COMPENSATE FOR THE WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS ASKED BY THE WEST.

## II. OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FOURTH ROUND

8. THE ALLIES COMMENCED THE CURRENT FOURTH ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN MID-SEPTEMBER BY MAKING A FURTHER PUSH FOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE PHASED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD REDUCE FIRST AND THAT REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN

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DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS NOT TO INCREASE THEIR OVERALL LEVEL OF NATO GROUND FORCES IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES AND THE WILLINGNESS OF ALL NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LUXEMBOURG, TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING, AND SHOWED HOW THESE POINTS FITTED INTO A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE PHASING ISSUE. HOWEVER, IN RESPONSE, THE EAST HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE BASIC WESTERN POSITION ON PHASING, THAT NON-US WESTERN DIRECT

PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS UNTIL AFTER THE SOVIET UNION HAD IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND TO SUBSTANTIAL GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWALS.

9. THEN, AS FORECAST IN ITS JULY 23, 1974 REPORT TO THE NATO COUNCIL, THE AD HOC GROUP MOVED TO SHIFT DISCUSSIONS IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS TOWARD SUBJECT MATTER RELATED TO THE COMMON CEILING BY ENGAGING THE EAST IN DISCUSSION OF WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR AN AGREED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND EXCHANGE OF DATA ON TOTALS OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, THE EAST IN RESPONSE REFUSED TO ENTER ON ANY DISCUSSION OF FORCE DEFINITIONS OR DATA UNTIL AFTER SETTLEMENT OF "QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE" INVOLVING THE ISSUES OF WHETHER THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN INITIAL REDUCTIONS, WHETHER REDUCTIONS WOULD BE BASED ON THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES, AND WHETHER THEY WOULD INVOLVE NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCE AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

10. FOR THEIR PART, AT THE OCTOBER 15 INFORMAL MEETING, THE WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES ADVANCED AN "OFFICIAL" INITIAL STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL CALLING FOR A 20,000-MAN REDUCTION ON EACH SIDE BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE WEST AND OF THE EAWW IN 1975. THEY SUBSEQUENTLY PRESENTED THIS "COMPROMISE" PROPOSAL AT THE OCTOBER 31 PLENARY MEETING. (DETAILS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ARE IN PARAGRAPH 29 OF THIS REPORT).

11. POSING AS A PRECONDITION WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THIS INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL, THE EAST AGREED IN THE  
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CONTEXT OF ITS INITIAL STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL TO THE CONCEPT OF AT LEAST TWO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS AND TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. AGAIN, SOLELY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF ITS INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL, THE EAST PROPOSED THAT US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS AGREED UNDER THIS PROPOSAL COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BEFORE REDUCTIONS OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE YEAR IN WHICH IMPLEMENTATION WOULD TAKE PLACE, WITH IMPLEMENTATION BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO TAKE PLACE IN THE SECOND SIX MONTHS OF THAT YEAR, AND ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE US AND USSR EACH TAKE HALF OF THE 20,000-MAN EQUAL NUMBER REDUCTIONS ALLOTTED TO EACH SIDE, A SHARE WHICH IN THE CASE OF THE US IS LARGER THAN ITS PROPORTION OF TOTAL NATO GROUND FORCES. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES MADE CLEAR THAT THESE LIMITED MOVES APPLIED ONLY TO THEIR INITIAL STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL.

12. IN RESPONSE, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TOLD THE EAST THAT, ASIDE FROM THE LIMITED POINTS JUST SPECIFIED, THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL IS IN ITS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IDENTICAL TO EARLIER EASTERN PROPOSALS,

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AND THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION: (A) BECAUSE IT FORESAW SYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WHICH TOOK NO ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS; (B) IT WOULD NOT ONLY FAIL TO PRESENT ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, BUT WOULD CODIFY THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD SET THE PATTERN FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS; (C) THE PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE ALL PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE IN THE FIRST PASE; AND (D) IT APPARENTLY ALSO FORESAW NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS.

13. IT IS CLEAR THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE EASTERN INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE THE ALLIANCE TO FOREGO THE MILITARY SECURITY BENEFITS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, I.E., REDUCTION OF THE DANGERS OF  
THE OUTBREAK OR ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES THROUGH THE ESTAB-  
LISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY OF GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA  
OF REDUCTIONS; AND REDUCTION OF EASTERN CAPABILITIES FOR  
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SURPRISE ATTACK, PLUS ADDITION OF WARNING TIME THROUGH  
SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWALS.

14. ACCEPTANCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ALSO WOULD  
MEAN THAT THE WEST HAD ABANDONED ITS INSISTENCE ON SUBSTANTIAL,  
ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, A POSITION WHICH IT HAS FOR THE  
PAST SEVERAL YEARS PUBLICLY PRESENTED AS A CENTRAL WESTERN  
OBJECTIVE IN MBFR. IN CONTRAST TO THE WESTERN APPROACH,  
THE EASTERN INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL HAS THE FURTHER DEFECT  
THAT IT CONTAINS NO END GOAL FOR THE REDUCTION PROCESS AND  
COULD THEREFORE BE REPEATED AGAIN AND AGAIN IN FURTHER  
STAGES WITH THE SAME UNFAVORABLE MILITARY EFFECTS. AS  
AGREEMENT OF THIS TYPE COULD ENGENDER AN ATMOSPHERE OF  
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE WEST WHICH DID NOT REST ON ANY  
JUSTIFICATION. IN SHORT, SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD PLACE  
RESTRICTIONS ON FUTURE WESTERN MILITARY FLEXIBILITY WHICH  
WOULD NOT BE COMPENSATED FOR BY ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET REDUC-  
TIONS AND OTHER ADVANTAGES CONTAINED IN THE WESTERN PROGRAM.

15. TWO OTHER DEVELOPMENTS TOOK PLACE LATE IN THE  
ROUND. IN THE INFORMAL SESSION ON NOVEMBER 26, THE  
ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FOR A NON-  
INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO MEET EASTERN  
CHARGES THAT LIMITATION OF REDUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCES ALONE  
COULD RESULT IN UNCONTROLLED INCREASE OF AIR FORCES AND  
THUS TO STRENGTHEN THE LOGIC OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A  
COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

16. IN THE SAME SESSION, WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES  
PRESENTED A WRITTEN PROPOSAL THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS  
COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO INCREASE THE TOTALS OF THEIR  
ARMED FORCE MANPOWER (WITH THE AGREED EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY)  
IN THE REDUCTION AREA FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. THIS PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS IS IMPRACTICAL BECAUSE THERE ARE  
NO AGREED TOTALS FOR FORCES IN THE AREA. IT IS THEREFORE UN-  
ENFORCEABLE AS REGARDS THE EAST, ALTHOUGH STRICT WESTERN AD-  
HERENCE WOULD BE VERIFIED BY PUBLIC MEDIA AND PARLIAMENTS.  
ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO MEAN THAT THE ALLIES HAD  
BEEN WILLING TO CONCLUDE AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT,  
HOWEVER LIMITED, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT EAST-WEST  
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FORCE RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD THUS UNDERMINE THE ALLIED CASE FOR ELIMINATING PACT GROUND FORCE SUPERIORITY IN FAVOR OF PARITY. IT WOULD HAVE THE HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE CONNOTATION OF IMPOSING NATIONAL CEILINGS, AND WOULD GIVE THE PACT POSSIBLY ENDURING CONTROLS OVER NATO FORCES WITHOUT THE COMPENSATING ADVANTAGE OF REDUCTIONS SUCH AS THOSE THE WEST ENVISAGES.

DRAFT AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC, PARTS III, IV AND V

### III. ALLIED APPROACH

18. AFTER RECONVENING ON SEPTEMBER 18, THE AD HOC GROUP DECIDED THAT IT SHOULD COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS BY MAKING A FURTHER PUSH FOR EASTERN AGREEMENT THAT REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. TO THAT END, AHG REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED COMMITMENT OF INCLUDING THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG IN REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ALSO USED NEW NAC GUIDANCE THAT DURATION OF THE NO-INCREASE AND REVIEW PERIODS WOULD BE CO-TERMINOUS AT FIVE YEARS, AND THE POINT THAT THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES WOULD BE NO LONGER THAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES MADE CLEAR, IN EACH CASE, THAT ALL THESE POINTS WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON REACHING A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

19. THE EASTERN RESPONSE, BOTH IN INFORMAL AND PLENARY MEETINGS, WAS NEGATIVE. IN AN OCTOBER 17 BILATERAL EXCHANGE, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE KHLESTOV CRITICIZED ALLIED LINKAGE OFFERS AS "INSUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONS TO A STARTING POSITION WHICH WAS EXTREME IN ITS UNREALISM." IN INFORMAL MEETINGS, THE EAST SAID THE "ALL PARTICIPANTS" OFFER WAS NOT A GENUINE COMMITMENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT ENVISAGE THAT A SPECIFIC OBLIGATION BE UNDERTAKEN, IT WAS EXCESSIVELY CONDITIONAL IN NATURE, AND IT VIOLATED THE AGREED RULE OF MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. IN PLENARY,

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EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES TERMED THE WESTERN PHASING CONCEPT ARTIFICIAL AND UNACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. AND IN BILATERALS, INFORMALS AND EVENTUALLY IN THE OCTOBER 31 SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT, THE EAST REITERATED ITS INSISTENCE



ON REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET AND EMPHASIZED ITS DEMAND FOR NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS, ARGUING THAT NO DIRECT PARTICIPANT SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO INCREASE ITS FORCES AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS AGREED REDUCTIONS. IN OPPOSING COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE CEILINGS, ESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ALSO STRESSED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS ARE NOT NEGOTIATING AS ALLIANCES; BUT RATHER AS INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL STATES.

20. BY MID-OCTOBER, AS FORESHADOWED IN THE JULY 23 AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS OF INFORMAL MEETINGS ON THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. WHILE KEEPING

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THE "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE FORMALLY ON THE TABLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE EAST, THE AD HOC GROUP DECIDED TO SEEK TO SHIFT DISCUSSION GRADUALLY TO CONSIDERATION OF THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS -- I.E., ASPECTS OF THE COMMON CEILING.

21. ACCORDINGLY, AT THE OCTOBER 15 INFORMAL MEETING, DRAWING ON NAC GUIDANCE, AHG REPRESENTATIVES SUGGESTED A DISCUSSION LEADING TO AN AGREED GROUND FORCE DEFINITION WHICH MIGHT RESULT, INTER ALIA, IN THE EXCLUSION OF GROUND BASED POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES (AND THE INCLUSION OF PACT GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL) FROM THE CURRENT ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. THE SUGGESTION FOR A DISCUSSION LEADING TO A GROUND FORCE DEFINITION WAS REPEATED IN THE OCTOBER 31 PLENARY STATEMENT.

2. THE EAST MADE NO REPLY FOR TWO WEEKS. SOVIET  
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REPRESENTATIVE KHLESTOV THEN SOUGHT TO SHELVE DISCUSSION OF AN AGREED GROUND FORCE DEFINITION. HE SAID THE EAST SAW NO POINT IN DISCUSSING A GROUND FORCE DEFINITION, BECAUSE THEY FAVORED INCLUSION OF ALL FORCES -- GROUND, AIR AND NUCLEAR -- IN REDUCTIONS. KHLESTOV CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD FOLLOW THEIR OWN LOGIC AND INDEPENDENTLY MAKE CORRECTIONS IN THEIR OWN FIGURES IF THEY CONSIDERED THAT WESTERN DATA WAS ERRONEOUS. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDED THAT THEY WOULD BE UNWILLING TO CONSIDER DEDUCTING GROUND BASED POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES FROM THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS UNLESS, INTER ALIA, THE EAST AGREED THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY IN GROUND FORCES.

23. IN RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN POINT THAT AIR FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES OPPOSED THE INCLUSION OF NATO AND PACT AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN REDUCTIONS. THEY ALSO DREW ON COUNCIL GUIDANCE TO STATE THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD NOT REDUCE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE TOTALS BECAUSE THE RESPECTIVE EAST-WEST AIR PERSONNEL TOTALS WERE SIMILAR, WITH A SLIGHT EDGE TO THE PACT. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ALSO STATED THAT CONTINUING ALLIED REVIEW OF DATA FOR BOTH NATO AND PACT GROUND FORCES INDICATED A SLIGHT INCREASE OF THE SAME DIMENSION FOR THE OVERALL TOTALS OF BOTH SIDES, THUS AGAIN CONFIRMING THE SIZE OF THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES NOTED THAT THE EAST HAD CONTESTED THE ACCURACY OF ALLIED DATA, THEY EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO EXCHANGE TOTALS FOR BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE AREA AND THEY SAID THAT THE ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN THEIR FIGURES IF EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES COULD PROVE WITH OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT WESTERN FIGURES FOR WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES ARE TOO HIGH. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD, THEREFORE, BE IN THE EAST'S INTEREST TO EXCHANGE DATA. BUT, IN REPLY TO A QUERY BY

KHLESTOV, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THAT THEY HAD NOT CHANGED THE ALLIED POSITION THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES.

24. THIS ALLIED APPROACH WAS, OF COURSE, DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN CASE FOR THE COMMON CEILING BY:

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(A) TRYING TO BRING THE EAST TO CORROBORATE THE EXISTENCE OF THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY THROUGH ACCEPTANCE OF WESTERN DATA OR DATA EXCHANGE;

(B) MORE GENERALLY, TRYING TO GET THE EAST INTO DISCUSSION OF THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS WHICH WOULD BE THE BASIC ELEMENTS FOR NEGOTIATION OF A COMMON CEILING;

(C) TRYING TO INDUCE THE EAST TO AGREE TO LIMIT REDUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCES BY PROVIDING AN INDUCEMENT TO DO SO.

25. SO FAR IN THIS ROUND, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO EXCHANGE DATA, OR EVEN TO OFFER SPECIFIC CRITICISMS OF WESTERN DATA, WHICH THEY NONETHELESS MAINTAIN IS INCORRECT. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASSERT THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF DATA CAN ONLY FOLLOW AGREEMENT ON BASIC ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE, SUCH AS THE QUESTIONS OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND WHAT TYPES OF FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED.

#### IV. EASTERN APPROACH

26. AT THE OUTSET OF THIS ROUND, THE EAST OPENED WITH HARDLINE POSITIONS BASED ON THEIR NOVEMBER 8, 1974 PROPOSED DRAFT AGREEMENT, STRESSING THE NEED FOR ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. BILATERALLY, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS, ESPECIALLY TO PREVENT FURTHER INCREASES OF THE BUNDESWEHR. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ECHOED GROMYKO'S REMARKS TO WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT CONCLUSION OF CSCE WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS IN MBFR.

27. FOR THE FIRST THREE WEEKS OF THE ROUND, THE EAST MADE NO REFERENCE TO THEIR EARLIER FIRST STEP PROPOSALS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ATTRIBUTED THIS RETICENCE TO THE FACT THAT THEIR FIRST STEP IDEAS HAD BEEN REJECTED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE LAST ROUND. IN THE FIRST FULL WEEK OF THE FOURTH ROUND, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES

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SHOWED LITTLE INTEREST IN DOING BUSINESS, SUGGESTING A SLOWER PACE FOR PLENARIES AND EXPRESSING INTEREST IN THE CHRISTMAS RECESS. IN SHORT, THE EAST ADOPTED AN OSTENTATIOUS POSTURE OF WAITING FOR THE WEST TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND TO MODIFY ITS POSITIONS.

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OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /079 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0680

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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28. THE FOCUS OF THE INITIAL INFORMAL SESSIONS WAS NEARLY ENTIRELY ON THE ALLIED PHASING PROPOSAL. BUT AT THE OCTOBER 15 MEETING, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES RE-SURFACED, IN A SLIGHTLY REVISED VERSION, THE EASTERN "FIRST STEP" PROPOSAL OF THE THIRD ROUND, DESIGNATING IT AS A FORMAL PROPOSAL OF THE FOUR WARSAW PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THE NEW "COMPROMISE" PROPOSAL, NOW

TERMED THE "INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL," WAS BEING ADVANCED IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING PRACTICAL PROGRESS. WHILE CONTINUING TO ADHERE TO THEIR BASIC PLAN, THE EAST SAID THE NEW PROPOSAL TOOK INTO ACCOUNT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, EXPRESSED WESTERN VIEWS.

29. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, MADE AT THE OCTOBER 15 INFORMAL AND REPEATED FORMALLY IN THE SAME TERMS BY THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE DURING THE OCTOBER 31 ANNIVERSARY PLENARY MEETING, CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING:

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A. DURING 1975, REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, NAMELY THE US, UK, FRG, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG AND CANADA, AND OF THE SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BY A TOTAL NUMBER OF 20,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

B. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE REDUCED BY 10,000 MEN EACH. THOSE OF THE FRG AND POLAND "FOR INSTANCE," WOULD BE REDUCED BY 5,000 MEN EACH, WITH THE REMAINING 5,000-MAN REDUCTION TO BE SHARED AMONG THE REST OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE.

C. THE FORCE REDUCTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1975 WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND US WOULD BE CARRIED OUT DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR, AND THOSE OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR.

D. THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED FOR 1975 SHOULD BE FORMALIZED IN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT AS AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. THIS INITIAL AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN AN OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER, MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

E. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, KHLESTOV ADDED THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD SPECIFY BOTH AMOUNTS AND TYPE OF EQUIPMENT TO BE REDUCED BY EACH PARTICIPANT, AND SHOULD INCLUDE ALL TYPES OF FORCES IN THE AREA -- GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCE UNITS AND UNITS ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

30. IN FOLLOW-UP BILATERAL MEETINGS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SOUGHT TO GAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT TO THEIR FIRST STEP APPROACH AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, TO EMPHASIZE THEIR FLEXIBILITY ON DETAILS OF THEIR INITIAL

REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL, AND TO ENCOURAGE WESTERN QUESTIONS AND/OR COUNTER-PROPOSALS, BUT CLEARLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST-STEP APPROACH. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CLAIMED FLEXIBILITY AS REGARDS THE DURATION OF THE SECRET

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REDUCTION PERIOD, THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE METHOD INSTEAD OF EQUAL NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS, AND ON "ALL OTHER ASPECTS" OF THE EASTERN FIRST-STEP APPROACH. HOWEVER, IN REPLYING TO SPECIFIC ALLIED QUESTIONS, DURING THE NOVEMBER 12 AND 19 INFORMAL MEETINGS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY ON ANY OF THESE POINTS. IN FACT, THE EAST EVEN SEEMED TO BE INSISTING, AS THEY DID LAST JUNE, ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE FIRST-STEP APPROACH BEFORE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ANSWER QUESTIONS THEY HAD INVITED ON THEIR OWN PROPOSAL.

31. FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 15 INFORMAL MEETING, IN AN ASSESSMENT SUBMITTED TO THE NAC, THE AD HOC GROUP CONCLUDED THAT THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. THE GROUP NOTED SOME LIMITED POSITIVE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL: IT DIFFERENTIATED TO SOME EXTENT BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET UNION, AND ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS; IT ALSO ENVISAGED TWO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS. BUT NEITHER OF THESE ELEMENTS WENT FAR ENOUGH TO TAKE ALLIED INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT AND THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL WAS IDENTICAL IN ITS ESSENTIAL SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS TO THE EARLIER -- UNACCEPTABLE -- EASTERN FIRST STEP AND SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSALS. THE GROUP THEREFORE DECIDED TO PRESS THE EAST HARD TO DROP ITS OCTOBER 15 PROPOSAL.

32. ACCORDINGLY, IN INFORMAL MEETINGS STARTING OCTOBER 22, AND IN A CONSIDERED RESPONSE DELIVERED DURING THE NOVEMBER 14 PLENARY SESSION, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES PRESENTED COMPREHENSIVE CRITIQUES OF THE EASTERN INITIAL STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES BRIEFLY NOTED "CERTAIN POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF A PROCEDURAL NATURE," BUT THEN WENT ON TO REFUTE, THROUGH A POINT BY POINT COMPARISON WITH THE NOVEMBER 8, 1973 DRAFT EASTERN AGREEMENT, THE EASTERN CLAIM THAT ITS OCTOBER PROPOSAL WAS A COMPROMISE. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES STATED THAT:

(A) THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FAILS TO DEAL WITH THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL SECRET

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EUROPE, NAMELY, THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE

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AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /079 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0681

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT REPRESENT ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN GROUND FORCES. TO THE CONTRARY, REDUCTION BY EQUAL NUMBERS IN MANPOWER AND TANKS WOULD ONLY WORSEN THE EXISTING DISPARITIES. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD CODIFY SUCH A WORSENERD SITUATION IN A FORMAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.

(B) THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD SET AN UNACCEPTABLE PATTERN OF SYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS FOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS. REDUCTIONS ON THIS BASIS WOULD NEVER LEAD TO A SITUATION OF PARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

(C) THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS ARE NOT SUBSTANTIAL

IN SCOPE. FAR FROM BRINGING ABOUT A GENUINE IMPROVEMENT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY, SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS WOULD RISK GENERATING, WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION, AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE.

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(D) EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES APPARENTLY ENVISAGE NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS.

(E) THE PROPOSAL ALSO MAKES NO PROVISION FOR APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES WHICH THE ALLIES REGARD AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ANY AGREEMENT.

(F) WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION ON WHICH DISCUSSION HAS CHIEFLY FOCUSED OVER THE PAST HALF YEAR OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD STILL REQUIRE ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE IN THE FIRST PHASE. THIS FAILS TO TAKE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER.

(G) THE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAS THE BASIC DEFECT THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE GOAL FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

33. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT, FOR THESE AND OTHER REASONS, THEIR INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

34. THE EAST CRITICIZED THIS ALLIED REPLY AS "NEGATIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE." THEY SOUGHT TO SHIFT THE FOCUS OF INFORMAL MEETINGS TO THEIR TERRAIN, BY REFUSING TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY ANY OTHER TOPIC. THE EAST ALSO SOUGHT TO REAP PROPAGANDA DIVIDENDS BY LEAKING SELECTIVE DETAILS OF THEIR INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL TO THE WESTERN PRESS AND BY CHARACTERIZING IT AS A COMPROMISE DESIGNED TO "BREAK THE ICE IN VIENNA." ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES CRITICIZED THE EAST FOR SUCH PRESS LEAKS. THE AD HOC GROUP ALSO ADOPTED AND DREW UPON CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE TO COUNTERACT THIS EASTERN PRESS CAMPAIGN.

35. IN THE NOVEMBER 26 INFORMAL SESSION, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE KHLESTOV ADVANCED FOR THE WARSAW PACT A PROPOSAL TO FREEZE ALL MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THEIR PRELIMINARY RESPONSE, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES SAID THIS PROPOSAL WAS IMPRACTICAL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON THE NUMERICAL FORCE

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TOTALS OF EITHER SIDE, AND UNDESIRABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD NONETHELESS CONTRACTUALIZE THE PRESENT EAST-WEST FORCE RELATIONSHIP AND CREATE CEILINGS ON THE FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES SAID THE WEST HAD A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO THIS EASTERN PROPOSAL, AGREEMENT THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD MAKE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS AND COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, TOGETHER WITH A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT COVERING THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ADVANCED THE PROPOSAL FOR A MUTUAL NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AS A COMPLEMENT TO THE PROPOSED NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

V. OTHER ISSUES

36. IN THIS ROUND, THE WEST RESTATED ITS GENERAL RESERVATION REGARDING TREATMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION IN A DETAILED PRESENTATION BY THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE. THE HUNGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE REPLIED IN THE NOVEMBER 14 PLENARY MEETING BY REITERATING THE STANDARD EASTERN POSITION ON HUNGARY. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT MENTION ITALY SPECIFICALLY, AS HE HAD DONE IN THE JULY 17 PLENARY MEETING.

37. AS REGARD THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF SECURITY OF THE FLANKS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE STRESSED THAT AGREEMENTS MUST SAFEGUARD AND NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS. AS MENTIONED IN PREVIOUS REPORTS, THE EASTERN SIDE SEEMS TO ACCEPT IN GENERAL TERMS THIS ALLIED REQUIREMENT.

38. ON STABILIZING MEASURES, THE ALLIES PLAN IN THEIR DECEMBER 5 PLENARY STATEMENT TO RESTATE THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS THEY HAVE MADE AND TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THESE PROPOSALS. THE ALLIES ALSO PLAN TO REITERATE THEIR GENERAL POSITION ON VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION DURING THE DECEMBER 5 PLENARY. THE EAST HAS AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES DURING THE CURRENT ROUND.

END OF TEXT OF REPORT TO NAC.RESOR

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